I conclude that often it is not more detailed models or the more precise equations they engender that leads to better understanding, but rather an insightful use of knowledge at hand to determine which similarity principles are appropriate in allowing us to infer what we do not know from what we are able to observe.
In December 2003, a pilot set out to fly a full-scale replica of a machine that had been flown a hundred years earlier.
The flight was planned as part of a centennial celebration of the first sustained human-piloted, powered, controlled heavier-than-air flight. The attempt, made December 17th, took place at the same spot --Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina --where Orville Wright made a successful, historically significant flight with his flying machine, and exactly one hundred years to the minute after it. The organization that built the replica had spent years building an exact replica of the structure and the engine, using exactly the same materials used in the original, even using period tools to build some of its parts. historically significant in that it proved that the problem of controlling sustained powered human-piloted flying machines had finally been solved. The later effects this achievement would have on society as a whole ---how, once the news spread to Europe, money would be invested by nations as well as by private industrialists in airplanes and airplane manufacturing ventures, that there would be major changes in how fast mail could be delivered, in how warfare would be conducted, and so on ---are not associated with the re-enactment.
Yet, this is not because economic and social phenomena cannot be the basis of similarity between particular situations.
In fact, judgements of similarity regarding the historical significance of the 1903 event have been made, just recently. I am referring, of course, to the historical flights of the privately developed spacecraft SpaceShipOne, which has been referred to as the "Wright Flyer of spacecraft" (Shostak, 2004) The similarity to Orville Wright's historic flight is being drawn on the basis of the historical significance of the event, rather than on the basis of similarity of the physics of the event. SpaceShipOne won a competition with a 10 million dollar prize, called the X-Prize, which required repeated, controlled space flights by a spacecraft whose design and execution was privately funded. Several self-made entrepreneurs dedicated time and significant parts of their personal fortunes towards the design of a spacecraft built to win the prize, with the ultimate goal of a successful commercial venture of a new sort --suborbital space travel.
Those who call the spacecraft "the Wright Flyer of spacecraft" do so because they think it will change the nature of space travel in society. Like the Wright Flyer, it was privately developed and cost a fraction of the sum spent by a talking about human endeavors, these will be interests humans have. That similarity turns out on this account to be relative to human interests is not an oversight on my part ---nor is it a drawback to the use of similarity. It does not mean that similarity is subjective as opposed to objective, merely that similarity is relative to a phenomenon. There is no such thing as absolute similarity; similarity can only be similarity with respect to some feature or phenomenon of interest.
The use of similarity in scientific inference is ubiquitous, although it is not always explicitly recognized. For instance, observations of events in the laboratory are considered informative about other things and events that go beyond the specifics of the observed case. In so doing, we are implicitly assuming there is a class of events or situations that are similar to the given event, and that the given event is informative of other events in that class. This is true in general, whether the area is mechanics, acoustics, hydrodynamics, chemistry, or whatever. A respect? What is our basis for being able to say which other objects and setups would behave like the one observed, were the experiment run on them? Think of the disappointing re-enactment of the flight attempted with an exact replica of the airplane I described at the opening of this paper. It is not that the explanation of the performance is a mystery to us; the point is that that example illustrates that distinctions need to be made in order to pick out the cases that will behave similarly from those that will not. In his paper in this volume, Michael
Heidelberger discusses Ludwig Prandtl's work on the theory of the boundary layer.
In general, if we want to play it absolutely safe in drawing inferences from an observed case, we would have to restrict our inference to cases using exactly the same fluid at exactly the same temperature and pressure, flowing at exactly the same velocity, in exactly the same geometrical configuration, at exactly the same scale. We would also have to use exactly the same size and shape of object, Thus, an experimenter needs to have some criterion for similarity, and, in fact, is employing similarity criteria whether or not he or she realizes it. That's my general point, and my point about Prandtl's experiment in particular is that Prandtl did not start from scratch with respect to criteria for hydrodynamical similarity. To carry out the kind of investigations he did, he needed to be able already to characterize the kind of situations he was going to investigate, and that means he used some criteria of hydrodynamical similarity, whether good or bad.
A researcher using incorrect similarity criteria is not going to get robust results from his or her investigations. Prandtl used appropriate similarity criteria, and he obtained spectacularly robust results. Froude's investigations led him to attribute this difference to the phenomenon now called the boundary layer, and in turn to attribute that phenomenon to fluid friction, or viscosity. This was another clue about what was a relevant criteria for similarity. All this was the background knowledge about hydrodynamical similarity that preceded Prandtl's work. This background knowledge enabled him to properly characterize the fluid flow situations he was investigating. My point is that this was crucial in two ways: it was crucial to his being able to achieve the experimental results he did in the first place, and it was crucial to the results he obtained being applicable to other situations.
Let me bring out this same two-sided point with another example from history of science: the principle of corresponding states, from chemistry and thermodynamics. This principle, due to van der Waals, has appeared a few times in discussions by philosophers of science (Glymour, 1970; Morrison 1988 Yet, as one textbook puts it: "This is a truly remarkable result." pointing out that the equation expressing the principle of corresponding states "is universal: all characteristics of individual fluids have disappeared from it or, rather, have been hidden in the reduction factors." (Sengers, 2002, p. 25) What I want to emphasize about the principle of corresponding states here is that we can think of it as providing a similarity criterion. It puts into one equivalence class the states of all substances that are at the same reduced pressure, temperature, and volume. This aspect of the principle provoked another scientist, Heike Kamerlingh Onnes, to look for its basis in another, known similarity principle. In his Nobel lecture, Onnes said that the law of corresponding states "had a particular attraction for me because I thought to find the basis for it in the stationary mechanical similarity of substances and from this point of view the study of deviations in substances of simple chemical structure with low critical temperatures seemed particularly important." (Onnes, 1913) He won the Nobel prize in 1913 for his success in applying these ideas to the problem of liquefying helium.
As with most similarity principles, there are two complementary faces to the law of corresponding states: on the one hand it supplies criteria for characterizing situations, and on the other it provides a means of translating the specific features of one situation into the corresponding specific features of another. As for the first aspect of the principle --characterizing situations --the characterization of a state is in terms of reduced pressure, temperature, and volume and is independent of the substance. As for the second aspect, it is easy to see how the translation between situations works here: take, for example, pressure. Suppose you conclude you have a substance in a certain state; then you know the reduced pressure. The pressure for a particular substance in that state can be found by multiplying the reduced pressure by the critical pressure of that substance. (Sengers, 2002, p. 25) I have been emphasizing the importance of such similarity principles as background knowledge necessary for carrying out investigations, even laboratory investigations. Let me close by saying a little about the source of such similarity principles.
In both hydrodynamic similarity and the law of corresponding states, the similarity principle is a consequence of an equation deemed applicable to the However, you don't need a governing equation in order to obtain a similarity principle; you can get by with much less.
Both hydrodynamical similarity and the law of corresponding states can be derived from merely the knowledge of the list of quantities upon which the phenomenon depends. That means that you need only know the form of the equation in the most general sense, i.e., that the phenomenon is a function of quantity 1, quantity 2, etc. As long as the list is complete, and doesn't contain extraneous quantities, the method of dimensional analysis will show a valid similarity principle valid; i.e., that the Reynolds number is indeed a basis for hydrodynamical similarity, and that the law of corresponding states is indeed a basis for thermodynamical similarity. Further, even if you don't have a candidate similarity principle to verify, the method will also always yield results, in the form of one or more nondimensional parameters that will provide a basis for similarity. It will not yield an equation describing the phenomenon, but no such equation is needed in order to establish similarity. There is one drawback to the method; since it is based upon a purely logical analysis of the dimensions of the quantities involved, the parameters produced by the method might not have physical significance. So, the complaint is often made that the method is not of much practical use.
There is a third approach that tries to make use of all the information and physical insight one might have at hand. I am taking the notion, called "configurational analysis", from a field of research called fire modelling, but it is applicable to any field. Now, fires are not tidy things --all kinds of factors matter, such as the configuration of the space where the fire occurs, how the configuration is changed by the fire devouring parts of a building, the kinds of materials and atmospheric conditions it encounters as it progresses, and so on.
The phenomena to be modelled have probably not even been exhaustively catalogued. Various types of pure science are brought to bear on the problem, although this is not a situation where we reasonably expect to obtain equations that describe the resulting phenomena. We may use our speculations or knowledge about physical mechanisms or fundamental principles to pick out important factors that affect the phenomenon of interest. What we use this information for, however, is not to solve equations. Rather, the goal is to figure out similarity conditions. We then use the similarity conditions to build models and, after using the model experimentally, to infer corresponding particular features of the situations they are meant to model. Alternatively, we can use observational data in lieu of experimental data; then, the similarity criteria help in categorizing and making inferences from cases at hand. Now, as I said, one drawback of dimensional analysis was that the nondimensional parameters the process produces are not guaranteed to have any physical significance, and in order to experiment with a model, we need to have parameters to vary that have some physical significance. What the configurational analysis approach involves is first using physical insight in conjunction with the logical principle of dimensional homogeneity. In the words of the author of a paper entitled "Fire Modeling" from which the notion of "configurational analysis" comes, the method "permits the welding of similitude theory and a 'feeling' for the problem at hand". The guiding idea for employing a 'feeling' for the problem is explained as follows:
Consider a device or process subject to change in space or time. Quantitative statements about the system will be statements about force, matter, or energy. A statement of the existence of a balance of forces, for example, will of necessity contain terms which are dimensionally identical, and division through by one of the terms will produce a set of force ratios. These ratios must be the same in similar systems. Similar statements may be made about conservation of matter and energy. (Hottel, 1961, p. 32) 1 Thus, very general principles such as conservation laws are employed to guide the selection of nondimensional parameters on which a similarity principle for the phenomenon of interest can be obtained. As Hottel has stated things, the starting point is to identify the "device or process" , but I think it clear that this includes identifying the phenomena associated with the device or the process that we are interested in, and any that might be causally important to it. This is where background knowledge such as that small viscosities can be important, or that the mutual attraction between the molecules of an enclosed gas can be important, is brought into the development of the similarity conditions.
Hottel mentions ratios of forces, masses, and energy, but it is not hard to see that the same approach could be taken for problems involving quantities of other sorts as well. Becker (1976 ) My point at the beginning of the paper was that similarity between particular situations was based upon similarity with respect to a phenomenon of interest.
When the equations describing a phenomenon are already in hand, there is more than enough information to establish similarity criteria. However, similarity criteria can be established with less information as well. There are methods that produce similarity criteria that do not require specifying the device or process, but the similarity criteria they produce may not be in a meaningful or useful form.
Now we see how a rather abstract characterization of a device or process --a model of the device or process, we might well call it --is employed in obtaining similarity criteria of practical significance that can be useful in designing experiments or collecting observational data.
Summarizing these reflections, we see that there are several ways that models can be involved in applying science:
--Anytime observations are used to make generalizations or inferences beyond an observed case, one event is being used as a model of another event, or of an equivalence class of other events. These comparisons are based upon similarity criteria, and are relative to a phenomenon or phenomena of interest. Even characterizing experiments and observations involves employing similarity criteria, whether the person doing so realizes it or not. Hence this use of a model --using one event as a model of another, which is a model in the sense of modelling phenomena --is ubiquitious in all sorts of scientific activities.
- Thus, models of machines and mechanisms can be (and generally are) involved in establishing criteria for similar phenomena, and these criteria provide guidance in using events to model other events. Conversely, models of phenomena such as events that model other events can be (and generally are) involved in experimentation on models of machines. 
